Genetics triumphed in America and Britain by establishing itself as a new science
with an artificial focus on the problem of transmission, and by discouraging research in areas that might threaten the claim that the nuclear gene was the sole determinant of heredity. Lysenko's approach seemed outlandish by the standards of classical genetics, but it arose from consideration of issues that were still taken seriously by most biologists outside the English-speaking world. Far from being a complete charlatan, Lysenko's early physiological work was quite sound. The Lysenko affair can no longer be judged in black and white terms, and it forces us to confront the possibility that there may be ideological dimension to the rise of hereditarian theories. (Pp. 151-152) Let me say loud and clear that I think that social constructivism is not simply philosophically wrong, but that it is morally pernicious. If power and success be all that count, then no distinction can be made between evolutionism and creationism-or, rather, the nod should probably go to the latter, since if you add up the fundamentalists of Christianity and of Islam, they surely outnumber the transformists. And if the scientifically grotesque, then why not the morally grotesque?
Note that I am not arguing against the relevance of sociological factors for a full historical understanding. What I am arguing against is simply the taking of their significance to the extreme. But, can one counter the full-blooded constructivist? All I can say is thatapart from the obvious problems of self-reference, if relativism be true, then why should one take notice of the relativist when the position is asserted?-Bowler certainly does not make a convincing case.
Since, in Bowler's treatment of the Darwinian revolution, I am named as a conservative fuddy-duddy, I re-examined my Darwinian Revolution. While I saw that some people took up selection after the Origin (a fact that Bowler underplays), I noted explicitly that most did not. I acknowledge fully that (most particularly since I wrote my book) Bowler more than anyone has documented the extent to which people did not accept Darwinism (i.e., selection), but his overall thesis is simply not that new. And, this being so, at the very least one can say that those like myself, who think that facts and logic count, did not illicitly read this view into the Darwinian revolution because we did not know what was going on.
What of Mendelism? The traditionalists (like myself) argue that the coming of Mendelian genetics, particularly as it was generalized to population genetics, was crucial. Bowler disputes that any of this represents objective truth. But, recall his apologetics for Lysenko. In response to these, let me put the record straight: Lysenko had no interest in theory. Such speculations as he had were cobbled together for him by the philosopher I. V. Prezent. So far from his early physiological work being "quite sound", his ideas and practices were wasteful and foolish, and were bitterly opposed from the beginning by the best Russian agriculturalists. His main evidence that vernalization could effect species change was one (one!) stalk of wheat. Indicative of the quality of his thought was the fact that Lysenko proudly announced this fact himself. And his views were not perverted by Marxist rhetoric because his knowledge of Marxism was about on a par with his knowledge of genetics. Lysenko's Marxism gave lip service a bad name. Does any of this matter? Have we just got a clash between a forward-looking philosopher and a traditionalist? This I do know. In good part because of Lysenko, the Russian economy is still a shambles today. In good part because of Lysenko, decent hardworking, patriotic scientists were starved to death or shot in the head. In good part because of Lysenko, real science was destroyed or sent underground. For myself, I do not want to judge in less than black or white terms. Michael Ruse, University of Guelph. Fodor's latest is divided into two parts. Part 1, "Intentionality", includes five previously published pieces and a substantial new offering occupying chapters three and four. Part 2, "Modularity", includes four previously published works, and an appendix.
Dennett's Brainstorms (1978) proved long ago just how effective a collection like this can be. Fodor has tried it for the second time. The present volume is, in my estimation, more successful than Representations (1981) because it focuses clearly on two related topics in a way that gives a compelling and complete (until now) exposition of Fodor's views on mental content and psychological architecture.
In part one, "Fodor's Guide" gives us Fodor's view of the options, and it positions himself and others in a kind of decision tree: Let me say loud and clear that I think that social constructivism is not simply philosophically wrong, but that it is morally pernicious. If power and success be all that count, then no distinction can be made between evolutionism and creationism-or, rather, the nod should probably go to the latter, since if you add up the fundamentalists of Christianity and of Islam, they surely outnumber the transformists. And if the scientifically grotesque, then why not the morally grotesque?
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